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RICHARD C. DIBBLEE, Adminis~
trator of the estate of JOHN RlCHARD SALMON, Deceased, and J\.IERRILL B. COLTO~,
Defendants and Respondents.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

LEOX A.l~:t) 1\fEADS,
P la-i.ntijf and Appellant,
-vs . RlCHARD C. DIBBL~~~.:. Admini:,;trator of the e!::tate of JOliN RICHA ltD S_.:\L·),l ()X~ l)t•tleased, and I\IERltlLL B . C()LTOK,:
Defe ~~ (/({uf.s a.·nil Re8 po-1~~l en I .s ~

)

\ Case X o. !H ~S( I

Cornes nO\V Richard (~. Dlbblee, admini~ttator of
the estate of ~T ohn J::,ichard Salrnon, deeeased 1 defendant
and respondent in the above-eaptioncd rnattert and vnrsuant to Itule 76 (e) of the l~tah Rules or Civil Procedure~
petitions the above-entitled c.onrt for a re-hearing of the
case on tlte following grounds and for the f ollov.ing
reasons~

to-wit:

1. That the court in deciding the case did so by
judicial legislation Vlithout support in fact or la\v for
so doing4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

·}
ll-1~

rl~hat

the court erred in interpreting Section 7SCtah Code Annotated.

:t That the decision of the court is wholly incon~i!5tcnt

vlith and cannot be reconciled ''lith the court's

vrevious holdings under the sarne statu tc.

t'5'rA rrEliEN1~ OF POINTS
POINT I.

THE COURT IN DECIDING THE CASE DID SO BY
.JUDI·CIAL LEGISLATION WITHOUT SUPPORT IN FACT
OR LAW 1-"'0R SO DOING+
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN INTERPRETING SECTION
78-11-12 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED.
POINT IIL
THE DECISION OF THE COURT IS WHOLLY INCON~
SJSTENT WITH AND CANNOT BE RECONCILED WITH
THE COURT~s PREVIOUS HOLDINGS UNDER THE SAME
~TATUTE.

BRII~~F 1~

SlJPPORT OF

l)~~TITION

.Sjnce all of the points are inter-related, they ·will
be argued together. The n1ajorit.y opinion is based upon
an analysis of Section 78-11-12 r:tah Code Annotated. In
reaching its result the majority opinion found it necessary
to break down the second .section of one sentence of the
~tatute into five subdivisions and then to rearrange and
rewrite the subdivisions to read in an entirely different
1nanner than the statute itselft The grammatical gym·
nast ies clearly indicates that the court resorted to judiw
~~iallegislation. If the Legislature had intended the statute to read as rearranged and set forth in the majority
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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opinion~

it "·ould have ~o \Yarded the ~tatute. ~.,urther
Ino l"{... , in r-earranging and rC\\Ti! ing the sta t11te, the
lllajority opinion \vholly ignores t l1c fir~t pottion of the
~(\rd.r.nr.e ~~hi(' h ~ irn ply state~ that '~ ea uses of act.i on ari sing· out oi' pl1y~ical injury to the person or death ~ ~~ shall
not abate upon the death of the \Vrongdoer.'' TheRe ¥lord~
hero me absolutely Ineaningle~~ in Y! e \V of tl tP 1naj ority
opinion. l f" the Legislat urc had intended the\ result
ac~ i evcd in tll e n -.:1j or i t~v opinion, it \\~ould ha vc been
'vholly unncces8ary to n1ake any ~tatement about cause~
of action not abating. It could have 'vritten a statutt~
along the lines aR rearranged hy the court in the majority
opinion. This it did not do. If \Ve are to give effect to the
first portion of the sentence and not disregard it.~ the
~econd half of the sentence, as indicated by Judge Henraid in his dissenting opinion, Inerc]y indicates ,~lho the
parties plaintiff n1ay be depending upon the facts prevailing and the applicability of the statute thereto. Only
in this 'vay can the 'vhole statute be given i t.s proper
tneanmg.
1

The majority opinion then goes on to st.ate that if
there is any ambiguity in the statute, it should be resolved
in favor of common sense, and thereby requires a decision
in favor of the plaintiff. This reasoning requires careful
analysis. Is it common sense to hold that the first portion
of one sentence of a statute deprives a person of a right,
and that the second portion of the sa1ne sentence gjves it
hack to him1

In the case of Fretz v. Anderson., 5 Utah (2d)
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300 Pae. (2d) ()4~, this sa•ne ~tatute \\··as thoroughly and
completely analyzed. The opinion in that case 'vas vlritten by one ol' the Judges vlho has concurred in the tuajority opinion in the l>rcscnt ca~e. The opinion vlas unani~
Inou8. ThP ..Judge \VritirJg· the opinion in the present ea~e
and the other '-'udge concurring therein both participated
in the Fretz r-nse and concurred in that opinion~ \\re
as~unte that the court in that case applied the smne COinIll on ~ ense rule of 'vhich it Jl OV{ ~peaks. In that case the
court had no trouble \vith the language of the statuter It
considered the 1vhole statute. In fact the 'vhole statute,
and not merely the first portion thereof, is clearly set
forth in the opinion~ .A. t that time the court felt that the
statute \va8 clear. It~ only conclusion after considering
the statute in its entirety was ' . the cau8e of action cannot
arise at a time beyond the life of the tort fcasor.H '\Te
assume that it 'vas applying com.Inon sen 8e '"hen it reached the result which it did~ In that case it was not determined 'vhether the tort feasor had d.ied before the plaintiff's accident 1.,he court reversed the case, granting a
ne'v trial in order that. the parties could muster their

evidence on this one missing phase of the accident,
stating:
"~**

The matter should be submitted to the
jury 'vith an explanation that if they believe from
all of the facts and cj renin stances disr..losed by the
evidence that the decea t::ied survived the first accident~ then the cause of action survived and, other
factors 11 eeessary to the plaintiff's cause being
present, the plainti.ff could recover; on the other
hand, if f-rom a1l oI the fa-cts and c i1~c liUl stances
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d isc[o,.,,ed by the r..r·idcnce they do not believe that
th.e decea..5ed Sl( rr·iced the f"i·n·il cullisio··n then the
pla·intiff ro1.dd ·not recot~er.'·' (Italics ours)

In the present r·n~L· \Ve l1ave the circu1nstanr.e 1vhich
\\'a~ 1ni~sing in the Fretz case. It 'vas clearly conceded
in the rnajority opinion that F~llcn '~ cause of action did
not come into exi.~·d.encc until after the tort feasor 'va~
dead, the majority OJ)inion stating: '\John having died
before Ellen, there \vas no liability to perpetuate against
hi.rn upon her death \vhich \voulrl not abate under the
provisions of 78-11-12."

Common se,n::.e to u~ \Vould scent to require that the
court 'vhich unanin1ously decided the Fretz case v&tould
have to find in our favor in the present cat;e. In fact, it
is amazing to us that the . fudge \vho "\Vrote and the tTudgcs
who r.oncurred in the decision in the Fretz case eould nu\v
\vrite and concur in the decision i.n the present case.
X either the Judge \Vho wrote the opinj_on nor the Judges
concurrjng therein had any difficulty in eonst.ruing the
enti ,.e statute at that time. Between the decisions of the
t\vo ease~ tl1ere ha~ been no amendment or change in the

statute. Is it common sense to find a statute clear and to
require an interpretation one \Vay in one ca-Re and then
require an entirely different interpretation in another
case 1 "\Ve submit that a statute v,.~hich has not been
changed or runended cannot as a matter of c.ommon sense
at one time be found to clearly require a dceision one
\vay and at another time compel a decision in exactly the
opposite direction. This is neither common sense nor
logic. If what the court say~ in the present opinion is
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right, then \VlH.tt it :said in the Fretz ra~fl v,:as V{rong . 1f
the plainti l'f in the l_)l"CHCnt action (+all maintain the suit,
then the plaintiff jn the l',retz ca~e should have been able
to have 1naintained the f.;Uit. The decision in the present
ease leaves the status of the lav~r in this state as interpreted by this court in confusion. The tv{o cases cannot
be reconciled. These two cases illustrate the trouble into
\vhich a court gets and the confusion v.rhich arises 'vhen
a court makes judicial legislation. If a statute ca1l~ for
varying interpretations at different times, then something
must be the 1natter \\-i.th the f.;tatute itself. If so, it is up
to the Legi~Jature and not for the courts to correet. th1~
condition.

Although the majority opinion Inay reach a desirabl~
result, this i~ no ground or justification for the court by
judicial I egisla t ion to realize that result.
As indicated by this court in the case of Brown r.
W·i!lltt1nan 1 47 U tall 31, 151 Pac. ;166:
~""\.Vhilc

the common-la'\t~ rule js a harsh one~
and its enforcement in this case is pecu1iarly unjust, \\·'C nevertheless can s \::·e no \ray of es ca.ping
it. The right and power, as ·well as the duty, of
creating right~ and to provide remedies, lies vntJt

the Legislature~ and not with the courts. Court~
can on1y protect and enforc~ existing rights, and
they may do that only in accordance \vith estab·
lished and knovm. remedies."

The argument of har~hness or unintentional omission i~
not enough. The Legislature is the only one 'vho ran
correct the deficiency.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
COXCLUSIOX

'Ve respectfully submit that the petition for rehearing should be granted because it is apparent that the
court has resorted to judicial legislation in reaching its
result and that the decision 'vhen properly analyzed 1s not
based upon the common sense construction of which the
court speaks.

Respectfully submitted,
RICH & STRONG,
Attorne-J-Js

fo·r Defenda-nt and

Respondent
604-610 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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